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Abstract 
 
Legal norms and social behaviours are some of the human aspects 
surrounding the effectiveness and future of DRM security. Further 
exploration of these aspects would help unravel the complexities of the 
interaction between rights protection security and law. Most importantly, 
understanding the perspectives behind the circumvention of content security 
may have a significant impact on DRM effectiveness and acceptance at the 
same time.  While there has been valuable research on consumer 
acceptability (The INDICARE project, Bohle 2008, Akester 2009), there is 
hardly any work on the human perspective of content creators. Taking video 
games as a case study, this paper employs qualitative socio-legal analysis 
and an interdisciplinary approach to explore this particular aspect of content 
protection. 
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1. Introduction1 
Copyright infringements and the evolution of digital rights management 
(DRM) have been among the most antagonistic points of the digital era. The 
debate surrounding the effectiveness and future of rights protection 
mechanisms has been closely aligned to the subjects of interoperability, 
user privacy, user acceptance, and maintenance of secure systems. While 
research from the content industry focussed on the effectiveness of digital 
locks, most research from the users’ side examined legal and social impact 
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of content protection. But these human aspects of DRM technologies have 
been one of the lesser explored areas (Anderson, 2008, p. 679). Moreover, 
when human aspects were considered by the relevant literature, they 
mostly investigated the user perspective. Legal compliance and acceptability 
of protecting technologies has been hardly analysed from the viewpoint of 
the other players at stake: the content creator and the content distributor.  
It is questionable whether a flawless rights protection system can ever be 
accomplished when it is based on a technology incapable to distinguish 
between an attacker and an authorised user; and it is even more 
questionable whether copyright issues should be entirely entrusted to 
technology. On the other hand, it has been argued successfully that that 
self-enforcement of copyright lowers transaction costs and it is therefore 
considered economically optimal (Gordon 1982, p. 1654). However, it is 
submitted that this “computational copyright”(Conetta and Shafer 2014) 
can be considered truly successful only if it takes into account all 
perspectives involved. In other words, DRM should not ignore the human 
component in security strategies.  
This paper seeks to explore human aspects of DRM protection from the 
perspective of content developers. To this end it will review the available 
research and it will fill the gaps by providing original empirical data. We 
have chosen to focus on the game industry as a case study, because of its 
economic relevance compared to other creative industries. In 2014, for 
example, the UK computer video games market grew by 7.5% (to reach 
£2.5bn), while the market for videos decreased by 1.4% (to reach £2.2bn) 
and the market for music fell by 1.6% (to reach £1billion)(Butler 2014).  
While this has obvious positive consequences for growth and innovation, 
such an expansion should be matched by an extended attention to the 
fundamental values, the norms, and the social interactions impacted by 
these technologies. The perspectives in this work are limited to games, but 
the questions raised could be applied to any type of rights protected digital 
content. 
This paper aims to understand to what extent the human aspects 
surrounding DRM technology and circumvention2 are perceived, identified 
and understood by videogame developers. To this end, the paper consists of 
two parts. In the first part a systematic analysis of the relevant literature will 
help identifying the key human aspects revolving around content 
protection. The discussion surrounding fairness and DRM will be explored 
from the point of view of the content developers, content distributors, and 
content users. This part benefits from the contribution of academics from 
various disciplines (law, cyber security, game development) in order to give 
a multi-dimensional picture of the issues surrounding DRM. A number of key 
questions are expected to be identified by the analysis of these opposing 
perspectives, which will be proposed, in the second part of the paper, to a 
sample of developers from the videogame industry.  
2. The evolution of digital locks3 
Before DRM is discussed is more in detail it would be useful to briefly 
examine its evolution, particularly in terms of some approaches that have 
been followed throughout the history of computer/video games 
development. Whilst very early, embryonic attempts at games development 
did not particularly concern themselves overtly with DRM, as the market 
was not mainstream or large enough to warrant this, with the advent home 
computers in particular in the 1980s there emerged the growing need from 
developers to protect gaming software from piracy in order to safeguard 
revenue. With earlier consoles - at least until the advent of the generation 
of consoles which Sony’s original Playstation was a part of in the mid-1990s, 
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ones equipped with a CD drive - being cartridge-based (and thus being of 
lesser concern) the need for software protection focused, originally, on 
attempting to ensure any game could only be used by the intended user 
who purchased it via targeted checks. This usually manifested in the form of 
using a manual/physical approach; though the diversity (and often 
ingenuity) of methods employed remain fascinating to games audiences and 
relevant historians alike to this day (sometimes for the sheer imagination 
behind these and sometimes because of the incredible ease these could be 
bypassed today). 
This manual/physical approach, in pre-Internet days, would normally be 
reliant on inputting data from physical documentation provided alongside 
the game when purchased (i.e. included in its box). This could either be 
from the user manual itself or indeed something more elaborate included 
within the box of the game. A genre of games which explored more 
imaginative approaches linking DRM with materials and documents (plus on 
occasion the game itself) included with the title was adventure games; a 
very popular, story-driven and puzzle-based genre which was part of the 
gaming mainstream from the mid-1980s and during a large part of the 
1990s. It is also notable that this DRM protection would not always come at 
the beginning of the game but only once the player had made some 
progress (and could not progress further without passing the 
aforementioned targeted check with the correct user input, or worse yet, 
would be killed off as punishment for incorrect entries). Two developers of 
the era who both had a number of impactful and successful games in this 
genre and employed DRM (in different ways yet based on the above 
principle) were Sierra On-Line and Lucasfilm Games (both now defunct). 
Sierra On-Line used DRM on many of their titles, amongst which was, early 
on, King’s Quest III (1986) where the manual would contain the different 
steps to be followed and also components needed for different magic spells, 
all at the core of the gameplay. Leisure Suit Larry 5 (1991) features another 
typical approach of the era at DRM, that of codes in the provided 
documentation (this time to be used when the player needed to fly to 
different locations in order for the game to progress) presented however -
printed- in black font and red back background (attempting to make it 
difficult to photocopy this and pass it on to another player who has not 
purchased the game and is in possession of the documentation). Lucasfilm 
Games took this a step further yet with more complex approaches such as 
the one exhibited on the Secret of the Monkey Island game (1990). The box 
of the game included a physical, rotatable (with two different parts) 
contraption resembling a wheel which the player would use for the check 
(faces, years and locations were used on this particular game’s DRM). This 
approach was used again on the sequel of the game (1991), though this 
time the theme was not pirate faces as before (revolving around the theme 
of the series) but recipe parts and dosages. It is difficult to estimate how 
effective these approaches were and how much, if indeed at all, they 
deterred piracy. However, the intricacy/complexity of some of these 
approaches reveals how seriously protecting DRM was taken, already, 
during the 1980s and 1990s in gaming software.  
Today, naturally, there is no need for DRM approaches such as the above for 
games; which can not only alienate audiences for being cumbersome and 
obstructive (what happens if the user/player who has legally purchased the 
game misplaces one of the documents?), but also could be expensive and 
obsolete (as games have moved from the physical retail approach to digital 
downloads and boxes full of material are of the past) and would, in any 
case, be very easy to bypass. A very commonplace, modern approach for 
DRM instead is ensuring the user and game remain online at all times for a 
continuous check of any possible breach. This approach itself has evolved 
(indeed it dates back to media with related files remaining accessible on the 
computer running the game and is a natural successor of that) and while it is 
more streamlined in 2015 from a technical point of view there remain 
problems with it; albeit of a different nature to the ones observed with the 
earlier games discussed. An interesting case study for this is Blizzard’s Diablo 
3 (2012) for the PC platform (and later on for consoles as well). Whilst this 
DRM approach is effective, this specific game garnered a significant amount 
of attention as early issues with servers on the developer side effectively 
made it impossible for many users to play the much-anticipated game they 
had just purchased (even on the single-player mode). This attracted a 
significant amount of controversy because of the immense popularity of the 
game and, inevitably, a lot of negative publicity, not just for the game itself 
(which still performed well commercially and critically) but also, and 
predominantly, for this specific approach of enforcing DRM. Regardless of 
the problems and cases such as the Diablo 3 one above this approach of 
DRM is envisaged to continue to be used by a number of games; as it can 
offer additional advantages (not related to DRM) such as collecting player 
data that can then be analysed (for the developer’s and even player’s 
benefit), as we will see further below in this paper. 
2.  The “Unfairness” of DRM 
Piracy is the use of a copyrighted material without paying for it (Nagesh, 
2011). Digital piracy occurs regardless of what type of media is being 
developed or for what distribution platform it is intended for. The factors 
influencing the user’s desire to circumvent DRM in acts of piracy can be 
construed as a social problem driven by human aspects such as intent, 
motive, moral judgement, and social consensus. 
Possible reasons behind the circumvention of DRM go beyond any 
technological weaknesses of the security into the human aspects of security. 
The growth of online gaming, the uptake of faster internet connections 
along with the rise of initiatives such as the ‘Occupy Movement’ against 
corporatism and economic inequality (Townsend, 2015) have provided 
opponents to DRM with more ways to justify their circumventing actions. 
Arguably, video games manufacturers view DRM as a necessary instrument 
in the fight against copyright violation. However, the critics of DRM allege 
that it stifles innovation and fair competition by quashing lawful uses of 
digital content. As such, it is creating economic and social inequality 
regardless of the context of the intended use (Litlow, 2012, p.12). 
Because of this perceived economic and social inequality between rights 
holders and users of games, it becomes imperative for the legal system to 
ensure that there is fairness for all in the event of a legal dispute. Fairness is 
achieved when people restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield 
advantages for all (Hart, 1955, p. 17). Fairness in the English legal system is 
underpinned bythe principle of Equity. This is described as “the means by 
which a system of law balances the need for sufficient judicial discretion to 
achieve fairness in individual factual circumstances” (Hudson, 2012, p.5). 
Because of the perceived bias towards the rights holders, it is essential that 
“justice should be seen to involve procedural fairness and a fair decisions 
being reached by an objective decision-maker, whilst protecting the rights 
of individuals and promoting public confidence in the legal process” (Chang, 
2007, p. 323) 
Perhaps the most serious drawback to the debate surrounding the 
effectiveness and future of DRM is that fairness for all, as defined by Hart, 
may never be achievable across groups serving such different interests. 
Consequently, the usage restrictions implemented by content distributors 
extends beyond intellectual property monopoly and it often raises issues of 
consumer acceptance (Darroch,2012, p.136). Becauseof these restrictions, 
DRM can seem inequitable and unfair when applying Hart’s principle of 
fairness. This apparent lack of fairness and bias in the direction of rights-
holding organisations results in DRM getting a lot of attention by copyright 
academic, content industry and media (Diehl, 2012, p. 4). 
3. Why designing DRM is hard4 
DRM is a suite of technologies that protect the rights of various 
stakeholders associated with digital content.  Typically, these stakeholder 
are content producers, consumers, and publishers.  Although there is no 
standard model for a DRM architecture, DRM solutions typically include 
components for: 
* managing content to be protected, 
* creating and managing licenses that specify the rules for consumption of 
content, 
* tracking usage of content, to ensure this is in line with license rules, 
* submitting packaged content for management by the DRM architecture 
These components are also supported by a number of security services.  The 
expectations on these services are myriad and included guaranteeing the 
                                                     
4
 This section is authored by Dr Shamal Faily, Senior Lecturer in Systems Security 
Engineering within the Department of Computing and Informatics, Bournemouth 
University, sfaily@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
integrity of licenses, protecting content against tampering, authenticating 
consumers before protected content can be accessed, and safeguarding 
sensitive data at rest and in transit (Michaels et al., 2005).  These services 
are implemented to defend against attacks to DRM protocols, attacks 
against DRM client software, and the software and hardware used to store 
and render the protected content (Taban et al., 2006). 
Designing any software system to meet the security expectations of 
different stakeholder is hard because product innovation is the main goal 
for building software rather than security.  As a result, the time-consuming 
user research activities necessary for modelling these expectations is de-
emphasised, and difficult to sustain throughout long projects (Faily et al., 
2015).  DRM is unusual in that securing content is one of the key goals of 
any DRM system, but these challenges still remain because designers must 
be mindful of the impact of DRM on consumer rights (Kubesch and Wicker, 
2015).  Unfortunately, designing for DRM also introduces several particular 
challenges. 
First, as difficult as designing security is, designing DRM is even harder 
because it entails integrating security mechanisms such cryptographic 
libraries, access control systems, and secure storage solutions into a 
coherent whole.  Moreover, as (Michiels et al., 2005) indicates, there are 
many candidate architectures for satisfying the requirements of different 
stakeholders.  Each configuration might be associated with different threat 
and trust models, and have a different ‘attack surface’.   Moreover, despite 
the pervasiveness of DRM technology in practice, there are no case studies 
in the literature reporting on the design, evolution, and lessons learned 
implementing DRM software architectures ‘in the wild’.  Without such 
studies, there is little support for designers on encapsulating the 
expectations of different DRM stakeholders in DRM architectures. 
Second, the trust and threat models associated with DRM are byzantine.  
From a traditional security perspective, one might assume that both the 
content owner and content user are trustworthy, and any malicious agents 
may be trying to spoof communication traffic, or intercept and tamper with 
it.  However, when we think about DRM, these models start to break down.  
For example, content users may accept distributors knowing about purchase 
details, but may not be happy about distributing misusing this data by 
sharing it with 3rd parties.  Theoretical security models assume that 
legitimate use and misuse are well-defined, but this is not the case with 
DRM (Feigenbaum et al., 2002).  Moreover, as (Diehl, 2012) notes, not only 
does the content owner not trust the content user, there is no easy way for 
a content owner to distinguish between honest and dishonest users.  
Moreover, even if the content user could be trusted, this trust might not be 
warranted if another user controls the content user’s machine through 
malware. 
Finally, the business models upon which DRM are based are dynamic, and it 
is uncertain how suitable DRM designs in the literature are given the current 
socio-legal and socio-economic climate where DRM is now pervasive.  
Although interoperability has long been cited as a ‘grand challenge’ for 
ecosystems where heterogeneous DRM solutions are pervasive (Koenen et 
al, 2004), there has been little progress implementing interoperability in 
practice.  This is due in part to new classes of DRM attacks resulting from 
the need for device cross-compliancy and data leakage associated with the 
migrating content for interoperability (Taban et al., 2006).  However, it has 
also been suggested that interoperability requires DRM designers to publish 
more details of their design and implementation than they might feel 
comfortable doing (Diehl, 2012). 
3.   The Players in the DRM Game 
DRM systems are in essence technical locks designed to self-enforce 
copyright protection in the digital world. Traditionally, the golden triangle of 
the copyright stakeholders is formed by: a) the creator; b) the user; c) the 
distributor (Grosheide 2001, p 322). In what follows we will examine their 
different perspectives. 
 
3.1 Content Developers 
DRM impacts on a complex range of interests.5 Content developers are 
obviously one of the most relevant stakeholders, although they might not 
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necessarily rely on legislation to enforce their policies.6 Self-enforcement of 
digital rights might be more effectively entrusted to cyber-protection 
technologies, especially given the practical difficulty to pursue millions of 
infringers. 
It has been argued that some users will inevitably try to use digital content 
without paying the appropriate fee, unless they are prevented from doing 
so by societal rules and social consensus (Mayer-Schonberger, 2006). 
However, there is very little work on precisely which societal rules might be 
used to prevent the social perception that circumvention of DRM security in 
acts of piracy is a fair or a victimless act. Part of the ant-circumvention 
strategy of content developers relies on these rules (Yar 2008). 
For some content developers, moreover, the perception of DRM is arguably 
influenced by their business model, despite there is little literature 
dedicated to the relationship between business model choice and DRM 
deployment. For the case of videogame developers, for example, it is 
different whether they expect their product to generate a steady income 
stream or whether the product will be offered at a one-off price to a 
distributor, who will then take ownership of the rights and financial 
revenues. Many developers are start-ups often backed by external investors 
who have a financial interest in DRM deployment in order to maximise the 
return of their investment. In addition, changes in business models need to 
be considered in the wider DRM debate centred on the effectiveness and 
future of game security. Digital content production takes place in a very 
fast-moving environment,7 and while a business model can be fit or indeed 
need DRM implementation, changes or modifications of the same business 
model can have entirely different requirements in terms of security policy, 
especially if the user acceptance enters the equation. 
It is questionable whether game developers should be leaving DRM to the 
publisher to deploy. After all, they are the original owner of the copyright 
arising from the creation of the product. They might be entitled to decide 
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what usage restrictions are implemented on their creation. However, for a 
number of reasons that will be clearer in the last section of this paper, in 
practice (at least in the sector of game development) they prefer to leave 
content protection to the other side of the golden triangle: the distributor. 
3.2 Content Distributors 
The examined literature shows the distributors to have the strongest 
interests in DRM deployment. Developers are surrendering unprecedented 
control over their products to distributors (Darroch, 2012, p. 136). For 
developers to continuously improve the gameplay experience, they need a 
recurrent income stream or a large preliminary investment from a content 
distributor with a large market reach. 
Consumers now have a greater than ever choice of content through 
multiple merchants such as Google Play, iTunes, Xbox Live etc. As a 
consequence, one of the emerging business models for games is the 
‘freemium model’ where the core game content is offered for free but value 
is added by optional in-game purchases such as in-game characters, extra 
content, cheats or game customizations.  
Because of the increasing implementation of this model, consumers of 
games are no longer considered a mere submissive receiver of products 
through an initial one-time purchase. The freemium model appears to 
eliminate the need for DRM in the traditional sense, as wider distribution of 
the core free game content targets a wider market share for in-game 
purchasing resulting in the higher probability of in-game purchases. 
However, even in freemium models DRM is implemented on additional 
purchases. While under the traditional one-off purchase business model the 
distributor appears to be shouldering the entire burden of rights protection 
and security, in the freemium model content protection is implemented by 
the developer, according to the requirement of digital distributors. 
While the costs of DRM implementation have been object of analysis 
(Petrick 2004, at 27) not much attention has been paid to the legal 
implication of the fact that distributors are shouldering the entire rights 
protections and security burden. If DRM is a complex of security 
mechanisms designed to protect the game assets, the distributor ends up 
taking full responsibility and, as a consequence, liability, for the security of 
the game. If this is the case, distributors are seemingly accepting 
responsibility for any possible security vulnerability associated with the 
development code, the game engine, or indeed any aspect of the game. This 
might have important legal consequences, for example in terms of vicarious 
liability.8 
 
3.3 Content Users 
DRM consists of a variety of security mechanisms designed to prevent users 
from carrying out actions that may breach rights protected by copyright and 
IP law (Qun, 2010). However, this system of restrictions often fails to 
account for the permitted copyright exceptions granted to users in the EU 
or the fair use allowances granted in users in the USA (Favale 2008, p. 306). 
Both of these allowances permit backup copies for personal use, or for the 
purposes of educational use.  Users of rights-protected content accounted 
for only 20% of the total lobby meeting requests with the evaluating 
rapporteur of the EU European Parliament Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC 
(Reda, 2015). Regardless of the size of the stakeholder’s interest in DRM 
there is an underlying sense of an imbalance of power with the bias falling in 
the direction of rightholders. The rights holders appear to be free to 
undermine a number of lawful copyright limits granted by law to the users.9  
In addition, literature suggests that overly restrictive DRM systems are likely 
be counter-productive as they provide little in the way of an incentive for 
users to purchase legitimate, paid-for content (Darroch, 2012). It can be 
argued that the financial motives for user piracy or circumvention of DRM 
would be less prominent, if the pricing policies set by distributors were 
more aligned with current economic times.10 Unfair DRM in sum is not only 
against the law, but also against a sensible marketing policy. At present, 
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distributors have unprecedented levels of power over price determination 
and differentiation. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the user’s 
attitude towards - and acceptance of - DRM technologies (Darroch 2012). 
Another problem faced by users when interacting with the other 
stakeholders are language difficulties. For example, End User Licence 
Agreements (EULA), which include the Terms and Conditions of Use for 
rights-protected content, are often written using legalistic language and 
there is an apparent disengagement by content users of anything that 
appears written in that manner (Lemley 2006). In many cases the 
contractual relationship and legal terms that the user enters into with the 
rights holder are not given a second glance.  
Another example is the use of abbreviations in language used by different 
stakeholders, such as developers or distributors. In the online contracts the 
abbreviation TPM stands for Technological Protective Measure, but in the 
field of software development TPM is the abbreviation for Trusted Platform 
Module.11 These are only examples of the problems that can be caused by 
language difficulties across different stakeholder with mostly entirely 
different backgrounds and interests. 
4. The Need for Balance 
If the acceptance levels of DRM are to be improved, it is vital that a greater 
degree of balance is struck between the stakeholders (Dusollier 2003). As 
can be seen from the discussion in this paper, rights protection within 
cyber-security is a complex issue with multiple viewpoints and social 
arguments for and against its implementation, where a focus on fairness is 
seldom present. In the Courts of Law, however certain attention for balance 
and fairness is sometimes visible. For example, the issue of DRM has been 
examined at the highest European level with regard to circumvention on 
games consoles. This circumvention is sometimes achieved through the 
commercialization of modified chips (‘mod chips’) which allow the user to 
play unauthorised games. 
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This “is a crypto-graphic coprocessor chip that has been included on most 
enterprise-class PC and laptop motherboards produced in the past decade” 
(Challener, 2013). 
The European Court held that the protection of ‘effective’ Technological 
Protective Measures (TPMs) can be extended to external hardware devices 
such as mod chips because there is nothing in the Information Society 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament that forbids it, especially 
when considering the broad definition of TPMs provided by the directive. 
The Court however specified that a number of conditions need to be 
satisfied in order to allow the protection of TPMs. In particular, a) the aim 
pursued by the manufacturer implementing TPMs must be legitimate (e.g. it 
must seek copyright protection and not competition hindrance); b) TPMs 
must be suitable for the task (e.g. ‘effective’); c) certain proportionality 
criteria must be met, which includes a number of considerations: the 
volume of infringing behaviours compared to legitimate behaviours, and 
whether a different protection technology ‘could cause less interference’ 
with legitimate uses.  
It is obvious from the above ruling the struggle for fairness of the highest 
European Court. The “fair balance of interests”, provided in the recitals 
(albeit not in the text) of the EU Copyright Directive,12 seems to be seriously 
considered by the judiciary invested with copyright matters. 
However, it is unlikely that DRM systems will ever be able to accurately 
predict or read human intent and, as such, there is a very fine line between 
legitimate fair use actions (i.e. hardware modifications to allow bespoke 
home-brewed content to run or be used for backup purposes) and those 
actions that have a secondary purpose that can carry out unlawful 
circumvention of DRM and breach TPMs.  Ultimately, the DRM system 
cannot know enough about the circumstances outside of the computer 
(Felten, 2003).  
Moreover, human intent is only one part of the problem. Copyright 
infringement can be determined objectively, irrespective of the human 
intent, when the unlawful acts (unauthorised reproduction, communication, 
and distribution) are clarified by law. As this is not the case currently it can 
be suggested that legislative reform in this area is urgently needed.  
                                                     
12
Recital 31, Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society Official 
Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019 
5. The need for Clarity and Legal Certainty 
From a legal perspective, DRM can create a variety of different disputes in 
the legal areas of copyright, privacy, competition, contract, and other 
branches of law. 
The complexity of the legislation regulating anti-circumvention measures, 
which are the provisions impacting on DRM, does not help legal certainty. 
For example, in Europe Technological Protection Measures have to comply 
with copyright exceptions, according to the Copyright Directive. But each EU 
country has implemented the directive with a different selection of 
exceptions with which TPMs have to comply, and it applied different civil or 
criminal charges against DRM circumvention (Favale 2008, p. 688). 
In the US, the lack of a clear definition between fair uses from acts that 
would constitute copyright infringements does not help the status of DRM 
security. Although some uses are clearly fair and others clearly not fair, 
there is essentially a large grey area of uses that may or may not be 
conceived as fair and could only ever be settled with the assistance of a 
court ruling. Even a well-accomplished copyright lawyer cannot say with 
absolute certainty where the line between fair and unfair use is really found. 
(Felten, 2003, p. 56). 
Moreover, although DRM legal protection originates and is defined within 
copyright protection, it is in practice implemented to achieve anti-
competitive practices. For example, interoperability requirements provided 
by the software directive13 prompt essentially competition issues (Gasser 
and Palfrey 2007); whereas on the side of the user, there are substantive 
privacy issues to be considered, as DRM can and is often used to track user 
behaviour (Burk and Cohen, 2001; Feigenbaumet al. 2001; Cohen, 2003). 
Advances towards a balanced DRM will be determined not only by 
technology modifications, but also by the current and emerging economic 
and legal developments (Heileman and Jamkhedkar 2005). However, when 
markets go through rapid change such as the gaming sector has, it takes 
time for legislation to catch up (Samuelson, 2003, p. 41). A fragmentary and 
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out-dated legal framework increases the risk of litigation, which in turn 
increases variable costs to an unbearable extent for smaller players. 
Additionally, changes in the game development market, such as the 
development of new hardware platforms, different distribution methods, 
and new payment technologies, all carry risks and legal challenges that 
require access to legal professionals for those involved in disputes. These 
market factors aid the need for legal professionals specialising in the DRM 
sector, who are often at a loss trying to apply to new scenarios legislation 
already out-dated, or excessively complex. 
Additionally, the business models of the stakeholders involved in disputes 
around rights protection will also have an influence on the access to justice 
and legal outcome. The complexity of disputes in copyright law along with 
the nebulousness of the fair use exceptions, combined with the struggle of 
negotiating licensing agreements, mean that non-experts such as fledgling 
game developers are often at an informational disadvantage when they face 
a dispute involving DRM. In any legal dispute access to high quality legal 
advice is vital but also dependent on having the financial means to defend 
one’s position and seek the necessary guidance prior to litigation. Financial 
health and the ability to seek high quality legal advice is more commonly 
found in larger more established organisations than smaller nascent 
organisations (Davies, 2006, p. 48). 
In sum, the ever-changing nature of content security and the complex legal 
issues DRM can create impact of the performance and commercial viability 
of small content producers. These problems can only be counteracted by a 
simplification of DRM regulations and the easy accessibility of alternative 
dispute resolution systems. 
6. The Perspective of the Developers 
The analysis carried out in the first part of this paper has produced a 
number of questions, which we have summarised in the following: 
 What are the motives and incentives of DRM circumvention? 
 What are effective strategies against circumvention (Cultural? 
Legal? Commercial?) 
 Is DRM adding value? Or value it is best reached through other 
ways? 
 On DRM and Contract (EULA), are DRM developers aware of the 
legal issues? 
 Are Developers aware of DRM limits (e.g. copyright limits and 
exceptions)? 
 Overall is DRM a human (social, legal) problem or a technical one? 
And the solution? 
These questions formed the core of a semi-structured questionnaire that 
was submitted to a selection of UK based game developers. The responses 
to the questionnaire have been object of qualitative analysis. 
Our case studies implemented different business models: the Premium 
model online (one-off fee per game), the Freemium model online (game 
available for free and extras available for a fee), and the sale of game 
consoles. Interestingly, none of them reported to have given any 
consideration to content protection upfront, when choosing their business 
model. However, it was acknowledged that the need for DRM 
implementation varies among business models because the very need for 
protection and the concrete possibilities of protection are different. For 
example while the Freemium model has no need for protection at release 
stage, it needs DRM when additional features of the game are purchased. 
Conversely, game consoles and CD-based Premium models need to 
implement DRM upfront if they want to avoid infringement. Moreover, 
server-based products offer more possibilities for controlling usage 
restrictions compared to client-based games.  
In order to identify the source of content restrictions within each model, we 
have asked whether the platforms have imposed DRM on developers, 
contractually or otherwise (e.g. more or less binding business practices). The 
response of the developers suggested that all market leaders impose the 
implementation of DRM in the products they allow to commercialise, 
whereas some minor player do not require content restrictions. 
Developers’ opinion on possible incentives for circumventing DRM 
mentioned the technical challenge, for those that crack the game and make 
it available on peer-to-peer file sharing. Unskilled game downloaders from 
P2P platforms, conversely, according to the project participants were 
possibly incentivised by: a) getting the game without paying the price, b) 
trying the game before buying it (trial versions are no longer available), and 
c) freedom of using a lawfully purchased product. 
On the other side of the spectrum, developers’ incentives for the 
implementation of DRM were rather low. Developers know that DRM has a 
low consumer acceptance, and they fear that the market penetration of 
their products can be seriously impaired by content protection. However, 
they do implement content protection because this is required by the 
platform, especially those able to guarantee wider market distribution. 
Overall DRM is considered valuable, as it adds value to the product, but at 
the same time it is described as a necessary evil.  In short, the general 
feeling of the interviewees was that they would rather not to have to worry 
about DRM. They would happily leave the whole task to the distributing 
platforms. 
Interestingly, the main incentive arising from content protection and 
directly impacting on the interests of developers are the data monitoring 
possibilities offered by DRM. In short, product protection technologies allow 
studying users’ behaviour. This information is valuable to determine future 
product modifications and in general future market policies.   
Costs of DRM implementation were not perceived as relevant by game 
developers as mostly shifted on the distributor (the platform); and costs of 
DRM circumvention (piracy) vary among business models. While game 
consoles showed a fair confidence in the effectiveness of their DRM, the 
others found that the costs of breaches in content protection were offset by 
the advantages of broader circulation of the product in the market.  
All the interviewees seem to be aware of a certain amount of DRM 
circumvention on their products, however, they declare to take hardly any 
action against it. More in details, reported actions against DRM 
circumvention are: a) do nothing (“move on”), b) changing the code, c) 
complain with the platform. The latter action seems to be effective due to 
corporate IP policies of large platforms, which handle the “notice and take 
down” process rather swiftly (and, it appears, without judiciary scrutiny). 
Taking legal action seems to be considered the last resort from the 
interviewed developers, mainly because of cost/benefit considerations. In 
short, broad circulation of the product on the market is perceived as 
creating more advantages than losses. However, legal action is 
contemplated in the case of professional infringement, as in cases in which 
somebody cracks the digital lock in order to commercialize the game in 
competition with the right holder. 
The End User Licence Agreements (EULA) which is the contract between the 
user of the game and the rightholder (including the distributor) is either 
entirely handled by the platform or “borrowed” from competitors or other 
sources. No consideration seems to be given by developers to the legal 
aspects and implications of this document, in terms of legislation to comply 
with (copyright, data protection, consumer protection).  
Some of the developers have encountered data protection issues in their 
day-to-day activity, in particular when collecting behavioural data on users. 
They refer to have addressed this by screening identity information (e.g. the 
name of the user or the credit card details) and by providing privacy policies 
for each product, explaining what type of data is collected, and which are 
accessible online. No tailored legal advice was sought or provided, unless in 
presence of a specific problem, but general guidance seems to be available 
from industry trade bodies. 
Overall, the main problem about DRM technologies according to game 
developers is human/social, in the sense that DRM circumvention is not 
seriously perceived as “wrong”. They find the attempts to develop a social 
conscience about it, such as equalling infringement to stealing, are not 
effective and deceptive for the public. The issue of fairness is also perceived 
as tipping the balance against users, who cannot try the product before 
buying it, and cannot do what they want with things that they own. Legal 
sanctions against circumvention are also considered “unfair” as way too 
severe. However, they all concur that although DRM circumvention is 
basically a “human” issue, any viable solution can only be “technical”. Social 
and legal solutions are in fact perceived as highly ineffective. 
Finally, we have asked our project participants what their Dream Scenario 
would be on DRM. While the short impulsive answer was “a world without 
it”, a more serious reflection included the acknowledgement that a digital 
world without content protection would be neither reasonable nor viable. A 
more realistic dream scenario involves a flexible DRM that allows users 
more freedom while at the same time protecting the rights of the owner. 
Moreover, they would like a seamless DRM that is easy to implement, as 
they prefer to focus on the creative process. They believe that creating a 
very good product is more important than defending mediocre products 
from infringement. If the product is very good, some argued, consumer 
acceptance of DRM may increase, as the pleasure to play the game will 
overcome the annoyance of having usage restrictions. 
8. Conclusions 
There are multiple stakeholder views associated with DRM security. This 
paper searched the literature to provide some of them, and it gathered 
original data to complete the picture. Current research on DRM shows the 
human (social and legal) implication of DRM only in relation to the final user 
of the digital product. The perspective of the industry, whether content 
developers or distributors are instead mostly examined from a technical 
point of view (e.g. DRM effectiveness). We submit that in the complex 
picture surrounding DRM there are human (social/legal) aspects to be 
explored also elsewhere, on the side of content producers, whereas some 
other human (e.g. legal/economic) issues are to be pursued among the 
content distributors and the policy makers.  
The data we analysed in this paper suggest that while DRM circumvention is 
an essentially “human” problem, as it raises socio-cultural and legal issues, 
the only provided solutions are “technical”. In practice, industry-led 
research only aims at an increasingly effective DRM to address the issue of 
circumvention. However, as DRM advances, so does DRM circumvention, as 
technology can be defeated by another technology. Focusing on the human 
aspects surrounding this technology, on the side of all players of the DRM 
game, can provide new and more effective tools to appease this contentious 
issue. 
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